The federal role in the security of religious venues in America by Crockett, Michael L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-03
The federal role in the security of religious venues in America
Crockett, Michael L.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited  
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF RELIGIOUS 








 Thesis Advisor:   David Brannan 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
March 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:   
The Federal Role in the Security of Religious Venues In America 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Michael L. Crockett 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Increasing Islamic extremist terrorist attacks against primarily Christian worship sites in the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia pose disturbing questions:  Could terrorists attack places of worship or a religious icon in 
America, what security policies are currently in effect, and what would be the impact on the American People?  
This paper explores the potential consequences of neglecting the security of religious venues in America and how 
it could have strategic ramifications if ignored.  Could a successful and highly visible terrorist attack on an 
American worship site have such an effect on the American Public that it could drastically alter the war on terror, 
re-draw battle lines by faith, and launch a modern day Crusades?  What role does the federal government currently 
have in defending America’s religious venues against the threat of an Islamic extremist terrorist attack?  Are 
current security efforts adequate, and if not, what policies or new approach should be taken?   The author 
ultimately proposes a federally-led layered security engagement strategy model for religious venues.  This model 
utilizes an incentive-based federal resourcing approach to facilitate achieving optimal security while still 
preserving America’s core social tenet of protecting and ensuring the religious freedoms of its citizenry from 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
69 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Homeland Security, Religion, Separation of Church and State, Constitutional 
rights, private security, DHS, NCATF, training, incentivized, law enforcement 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF RELIGIOUS VENUES IN 
AMERICA 
 
Michael L. Crockett 
Commander, United States Navy 
B.S.W, University of Mississippi, 1988 
M.A., University of Rhode Island, 1995 
M.A., Naval War College, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 











Author:  Michael L. Crockett 
 
 





































 Increasing Islamic extremist terrorist attacks against primarily Christian worship 
sites in the Middle East and Southeast Asia pose disturbing questions:  Could terrorists 
attack places of worship or a religious icon in America, what security policies are 
currently in effect, and what would be the impact on the American People?  This paper 
explores the potential consequences of neglecting the security of religious venues in 
America and how it could have strategic ramifications if ignored.  Could a successful and 
highly visible terrorist attack on an American worship site have such an effect on the 
American Public that it could drastically alter the war on terror, re-draw battle lines by 
faith, and launch a modern day Crusades?  What role does the federal government 
currently have in defending America’s religious venues against the threat of an Islamic 
extremist terrorist attack?  Are current security efforts adequate, and if not, what policies 
or new approach should be taken?   The author ultimately proposes a federally-led 
layered security engagement strategy model for religious venues.  This model utilizes an 
incentive-based federal resourcing approach to facilitate achieving optimal security while 
still preserving America’s core social tenet of protecting and ensuring the religious 


















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii






B. THESIS STATEMENT...................................................................................3 
C.   METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................3 
II. TARGETING RELIGION IN AMERICA................................................................5 
A.   BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................5 
B. RELEVANCE ..................................................................................................8 
C. THE TERRORISTS ......................................................................................12 
D. TARGET SELECTION ................................................................................14 
E. TIMING..........................................................................................................16 
F. ATTACK PROFILES ...................................................................................17 
G. CONSEQUENCES OF A TERRORIST ATTACK UPON A 
RELIGIOUS VENUE IN AMERICA..........................................................18 
III. RELIGIOUS VENUE SECURITY ..........................................................................21 
A. AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS SECURITY TODAY......................................21 
B. LOCAL INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS SECURITY IN 
AMERICA......................................................................................................21 
C. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS SECURITY IN 
AMERICA......................................................................................................24 
D. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS SECURITY IN 
AMERICA......................................................................................................24 
E. OTHER NATIONAL RELIGIOUS SECURITY MODELS.....................26 
IV. FEDERAL POLICY REVIEW ................................................................................27 
A. CURRENT U.S. POLICY AND APPLICABLE LITERATURE .............27 
B. FINDINGS OF LITERATURE REVIEWED.............................................32 
C. CHALLENGES OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT ...................................32 
V. ALTERNATIVES FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS 
VENUE SECURITY..................................................................................................35 
A. NO INVOLVEMENT....................................................................................35 
B. MAINTAIN STATUS QUO..........................................................................35 
C. FEDERALLY REGULATED ......................................................................36 
VI. CLERGY FOCUS GROUP ......................................................................................37 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS...........................................................................................39 
A. RECOMMENDED OPTION FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN 
RELIGIOUS VENUE SECURITY ..............................................................39 
B. LAYERED SECURITY STRATEGY END-STATE—THE 
RECOMMENDED MODEL OF RELIGIOUS VENUE SECURITY .....40 
1. Awareness ...........................................................................................40 
 viii
2. Deterrence...........................................................................................41 
3. Preparedness ......................................................................................42 
C. CHALLENGES OF THIS MODEL.............................................................44 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.............................46 
VIII. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................47 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................49 

















































I am indebted to Professors David Brannan, Christopher Bellavita, and Lauren 
Wollman for their assistance, advice, and patience and thank my wife, Rebecca, and our 
daughters Lauren, Hannah, and Madeline for sacrificing a great deal of “Daddy time” to 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
This war is fundamentally religious.  Under no circumstances should we 
forget this enmity between us and the infidels.  For, the enmity is based on 
creed. 
~ Speech by Osama Bin Laden, Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel Television, 
November 3, 2001. 
Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the 
distance of history.  But our responsibility to history is already clear:  to 
answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. 
~ U.S. President George W. Bush’s remarks at The National Day of 
Prayer and Remembrance,  National Cathedral, Washington D.C., 
September 14, 2001. 
 
A. PURPOSE 
The increasing number of Islamic extremist terrorist attacks against primarily 
Christian worship sites in the Middle East and Southeast Asia pose disturbing questions:  
How easy would it be for terrorists to attack a place of worship in America, what security 
policies are currently in effect, and what would be the impact on the American People if a 
terrorist attack like this were to happen in the United States? 
This paper explores the potential consequences of neglecting the security of 
religious sites and events in America and how a lack of security at home or overseas 
could have strategic ramifications if ignored.   Could a successful and highly visible 
terrorist attack on a worship site in the United States have such a negative effect on the 
American Public that it could drastically alter the overall global war on terror, re-draw 
battle lines based on religion, and even launch a modern day version of the Crusades?  
The U.S. Federal government currently exercises no routine oversight in the 
security of religious venues in America.  For the purposes of this research, religious 
venues include places of worship, public religious gatherings, major televised worship 
services, or appearances by well-known or prominent religious leaders whether of 
American or foreign nationality.  Possible explanations for this lack of federal oversight 
include:  Constitutional First Amendment concerns regarding the country’s often 
2 
controversial separation of Church and State, its potential as a political powder keg, and 
the fact that most religious gatherings occur within local jurisdictions.   
There are a few exceptions to the lack of direct federal oversight.  If the President 
is in attendance (e.g., services at the National Cathedral) or a religious leader is visiting 
America (e.g., the Pope), the United States Secret Service is the designated lead federal 
agency in charge of security.  In the Pope’s case, however, his security is provided by the 
Secret Service primarily because he is technically a head of state.1   
The current global war on terror, like the terrorist attacks of 9/11, has changed the 
commonly perceived landscape of public safety and security.  Today, religious security 
may be viewed through a new lens while balancing the need for security with religious 
freedom.    
On television broadcasts from Al Jazeera, Muslim countries view America as 
being pro-Israel, a country eager to wage war against Arab nations, and a nation that 
deploys armed Crusaders into their holy land.  The U.S. military strengthened that image 
after military personnel were photographed disgracing Muslim prisoners at Abu Gharib 
prison and U.S. Marines were videotaped killing a wounded Muslim insurgent inside a 
Baghdad mosque.2    
This research will try to determine if a threat to America’s religious venues exists 
and whether or not there is a legitimate need for federal involvement with domestic 
religious security.  Other aspects of religious security will be explored, including the 
threat of Islamic extremism, potential targeting methods, and a review of existing 
literature surrounding governmental involvement with religious security.   
America’s religious venues may be targeted by Islamic extremists.  A number of 
factors may contribute to this potential vulnerability, among them:  the increasingly 
popular and rapid spread of Islam, America’s ongoing war on terror, and the American-
                                                 
1 www.secretservice.gov.  (accessed March 9, 2006)  The Secret Service is designated as the lead 
federal agency for a Papal visit primarily because of the Pope’s status as a head of state of The Vatican.  
2 “Falluja Mosque Marine Escapes Charge.”  AlJazeera.net.  February 24, 2005. 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/5C41ABE7-A613-47D1-AB91-C5298491BBFA.htm (accessed 
February 11, 2006) or “Iraqi’s Killing by Marine Dominates Arab Media.” MSNBC. November 17, 2004.  
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6514451/ (accessed February 11, 2006).  Both links reveal how the Arab media 
gave substantial air time and attention to the shooting. 
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led occupation of Iraq.  Are religious landmarks in America (and, to an extent, the world) 
soft targets for Islamic militant terrorism and could their destruction create a lever of 
influence that could transform the West’s current war on terror into a modern day 
Crusade?  
 
B. THESIS STATEMENT 
What role does the federal government currently have in defending America’s 
religious venues against the threat of an Islamic extremist terrorist attack, are current 
efforts adequate, and if not, what policies or new approach should be taken to cover this 
possible seam in U.S. homeland security?     
 
C.   METHODOLOGY  
This research was conducted as a qualitative strategic assessment of the threat of 
Islamic extremism to America’s religious venues and the U.S. federal government’s role 
in their protection.   To that end, this research assesses current federal legislation and 
policies towards governmental involvement in religious security affairs before making 
recommendations for federal strategy and future research.     
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II. TARGETING RELIGION IN AMERICA  
…there is still an enemy out there which hates America.  They hate us 
because of what we love.  We love freedom.  We love the fact that people 
can worship an almighty God any way they see fit here in America. 
 
- President George W. Bush speaking to Congress, September 28, 2002 
 
A.   BACKGROUND 
 In 1291 the medieval Crusades came to a bloody close, leaving millions of people 
dead from a prolonged war where fighters had faced-off against each other based solely 
on religious preference.  According to Harvard Professor and renowned author Samuel P. 
Huntington, in The Clash of Civilizations and the Making of World Order, the 
groundwork for future conflict was laid centuries ago: 
Conflict was, on the one hand, a product of difference, particularly the 
Muslim concept of Islam as a way of life transcending and uniting religion 
and politics versus the Western Christian concept of the separate realms of 
God and Caesar. 3  
The struggle between Islam and the West continues to be played out today in the jungles 
of Southeast Asia, the mountains of Afghanistan, the dusty streets of Baghdad, and the 
skyline of Manhattan.  Huntington point remains relevant still, as manifested in the 
domestic physical security of religious sites, events, or leaders – America’s separation of 
church and state.  There exists a significant paradox:  in the United Sates, federal, state, 
and local governments cannot mandate control and protection over one of the nation’s 
most prized civil liberties – freedom of religion. 
      Individual religious leaders have long been the target of assassins.  A small group 
of terrorists or a lone actor could also elect to target individual religious leaders.  In Delhi 
India in 1948, perhaps the world’s best known religious leader was assassinated for his 
political stance on a religious issue.  Mahatma Gandhi was shot to death by a fellow 
                                                 
3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1st ed. (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 210. 
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Hindu who was enraged that Gandhi desired to give Muslims equal rights.4  In 1968, 
America was the scene of the killing of another spiritual and political leader.  Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. was gunned down by a lone shooter on a hotel balcony in Memphis, 
Tennessee.  Although he wasn’t killed for his religious beliefs, Dr. King’s focus on civil 
rights had his personal faith and convictions as its foundation, and, like in Ghandi’s case, 
led to his eventual demise at the hands of an assassin.  In Chile in 1981, a Turkish man 
got close enough to the Pope’s motorcade to shoot and almost kill Pope John Paul II.  
Although rumors of his affiliation with terrorist organizations were widespread, he was 
later determined to be simply deranged and was sentenced to prison until his release in 
January of 2006.     
      At times religion and politics have overlapped in the targeting of specific groups 
of individuals.  In 1972, one of history’s most notorious and televised terrorist actions 
transpired in front of millions of viewers when members of the PLO’s Black September 
Organization (BSO) attacked the Olympic Village in Munich, Germany, eventually 
taking 11 Israeli athletes hostage before massacring them.5   
      In 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi President Sadaam Hussein 
attempted to break the U.S.-led coalition by launching Scud Missiles against Israel, but 
failed in his attempt to divide the war into Christians and Jews versus Muslims.  This 
was, arguably, the first precedent-setting effort to create a wartime schism in an attempt 
to redefine a war as one between faiths.  Following the fall of the Hussein regime in Iraq, 
the American-led occupation and struggle against insurgents and jihad-seeking 
Mujahadeen continues.    
      As recently as November of 2004, religious intolerance boiled over into the arts 
with severe repercussions.  In 2004 and after making a controversial film about the 
treatment of women in Islamic society, Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh died at the 
hands of a radical Muslim extremist who, after shooting the filmmaker, sliced his throat 
almost to the point of beheading and then used a knife to pin a letter of warning to Van 
Gogh’s chest.  Following the murder, mosques in many Dutch cities were targets of failed 
                                                 
4http://www.mahatma.org.in/murderattempts/attempts.jsp?link=ld&id=1&cat=murderattempts 
(accessed February 11, 2006) There were at least six assassination attempts prior to Mahatma Gandhi’s 
murder.  
5 “BBC History - Mohandas Gandhi (1869-1948).” Available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures?gandhi_mohandas.shtml (accessed February 29, 2006) 
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arson attempts and vandalism.6  This incident and the resultant Anti-Muslim attacks of 
retribution on Dutch mosques shed light on additional consequences that may result from 
a similar attack against an American religious venue.  Terrorists could intentionally 
attack an American mosque and blame the carnage on the U.S. government or followers 
of one of the Western faiths in order to further their own agenda. 
       In August of 2005, a mentally unstable woman murdered a major religious figure 
in France.   Nonagenarian “Brother Roger” Schultz, the founder of the 65 year old Taize 
Community (well known for its mixed Catholic and Protestant make-up) was stabbed 
three times in the throat in front of 2500 worshipers during a Taize service.7   
Modern day revelations and attempts to heal interfaith relations have refreshed the 
world’s memory of the Crusades, directly linking Catholicism, arguably the most 
recognizable of Western faiths, as the millennia-old enemy of Islam, publicly linking 
religion directly with politics.  In the year 2000, Pope John Paul II, offered an 
unprecedented apology to the Muslims of the world for the Catholic Church’s role in that 
dark chapter in Human history.    The Catholic Church’s culpability was cemented with 
this admission of the Church’s transgression from the Pontiff himself:  "For the role that 
each one of us has had, with his behavior, in these evils, contributing to a disfigurement 
of the face of the Church, we humbly ask forgiveness."8   The religious website 
biblia.com provides further insight regarding the Pope’s apology: “The sins were not 
specifically enumerated. But when you boil them down they come to this – they are 
political acts by an institution of faith: the Crusades, The Inquisition, persecution of Jews, 
the forced conversions of Indians and Africans, acts to preserve the power and enrich the 
                                                 
6 “Van Gogh Murder Suspect in Court,” BBC News,  April 13, 2005.  
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4440347.stm (accessed 
February 11, 2006). 
Andrew Stuttaford, “How Enlightenment Dies,” National Review Online,  November 12, 2004. 
http://www.nationalreview.com/stuttaford/stuttaford200411120833.asp  (accessed February 11, 2006) 
“Muslim Sites Attacked in Holland,”   English Al Jazeera News,  November 8, 2004.   
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4BC6FA72-4217-4F20-AEC8-B3B1E614CE85.htm  (accessed 
February 11, 2006).   These links attest to the retaliatory effect of the Van Gogh murder and how had how 
Dutch mosques became the target of anti-Muslim retaliation. 
7 Phillip Pullella, “Pope, Leaders Shocked by Murder of ‘Brother Roger,’ ” Reuters (August 17, 2005).  
http://english.epochtimes.com/news/5-8-17/31347.html (accessed February 11, 2006). 
8 “The Crusades, the Inquisition...Apology of the Pope,” Biblia.com.   
http://biblia.com/islam/crusades.htm (accessed February 11, 2006) 
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Church, acts committed in Concert with Monarchs bound to the church by oath.”9  If 
indeed the Muslim faith has a thousand-year memory, it is a memory overwhelmed by 
Western atrocities that have been publicly acknowledged and renewed by modern-day 
religious leaders of non-Muslim faiths.  
      
B. RELEVANCE 
Why would a terrorist see American religion as a potential center of gravity worth 
targeting? The increasing frequency of religiously-motivated Islamic extremist terrorist 
attacks overseas may represent a potential harbinger of future attacks on religious targets 
in America.  Acts of terrorism are occurring at or near worship sites around the world by 
Muslim extremists who are motivated by the same type of religious ideology that 
emboldened 19 suicidal extremists to hijack four airliners on 9/11.   
Faith and terrorism are increasingly inseparable, and the evidence is alarming.  
There has been a significant and alarming trend recently, albeit overseas, of organized 
radical Islamic terrorists attacking Christian churches in Iraq, Pakistan, and Southeast 
Asia.  A few examples:  On October 28, 2001, six gunmen entered a church in Pakistan’s 
Punjab Province where 100 Christians were worshiping, killing 16 worshipers and a 
Muslim guard with small arms fire.  No arrests were made.10  In 2002, thirty Palestinian 
militants took over the Church of the Nativity in Jerusalem, with hostages that included 
clergymen from three Christian denominations before they peacefully surrendered.11  On 
Sunday, August 1, 2004 four Baghdad churches were attacked with car bombs, killing 11 
people and injuring 47 others.12    
Muslims worldwide also have reason to be outraged over American 
transgressions.  The images of the prisoner abuse atrocities at Abu Gharib, when 
                                                 
9 “The Crusades, the Inquisition...Apology of the Pope.” Biblia.com.   
http://biblia.com/islam/crusades.htm (accessed February 11, 2006). 
10 Scott Baldauf, “Pakistan Tightens Church Security,” Christian Science Monitor (October 29, 2001) 
.http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1029/p6s1-wosc.html (accessed February 11, 2006). 
11  C.J. Chivers, “Israel’s Threat of an Attack on a Church Is Pulled Back,” New York Times (April 27, 
2002). http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F40610F93B5A0C748EDDAD0894DA404482 
(accessed February 28, 2006) 
12 Pamela Constable, “Church Bombings Outrage Iraqis of All Faiths,” Washington Post (August 3, 
2004, A01). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35361-2004Aug2.html (accessed February 
11, 2006). 
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juxtaposed with the video of a U.S. Marines shooting a wounded insurgent barricaded 
inside a mosque, could provide justification for an Islamic terrorist organization or a lone 
actor to target religious symbols of Western faith, in America or abroad. 
Religion remains the primary motivation behind acts of terror by Islamic 
extremists.  Terrorism specialist and author Bruce Hoffman has written, “The salience of 
religion as the major driving force behind international terrorism in the 1990s is further 
evidenced by the fact that the most serious terrorist acts of the decade—whether  
reckoned in terms of political implications and consequences or in the numbers of 
fatalities caused—have all had a significant religious dimension and/or motivation.”13    
With the current American-led war on terror targeting primarily Islamic extremist 
groups, and the occupation of Iraq approaching its three year anniversary, America 
maintains its position as the world’s dominant hegemon and an increasingly popular 
target of Third World frustration.  As Hoffman points out, “Moreover, as the only super-
power, the United States may likely be blamed for more of the world’s ills—and 
therefore could be the focus of more terrorist attacks—than before.”14  
To many in the Middle East, America is already seen as the Western leader of a 
modern Crusade against Islam, and therefore the most logical target for religiously-
motivated terrorism. In his book, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, the author “Anonymous” 
(who later disclosed his identity as career CIA Agent Michael Scheuer, author of 
Imperial Hubris), wrote of America’s most wanted terrorist, Osama Bin Laden, and his 
ideology of terrorism, contending that Osama bin Laden equates the Judeo-Christian 
alliance as anti-Islamic and therefore worthy of targeting through holy jihad: 
Osama bin Laden is not constrained by America’s tenets of political 
correctness.  He has asserted without doubt, vagueness, or qualification 
the superiority of Islam and Islamic life, and has described in detail his 
hatred for Jews and Christians because of their occupation of Islamic lands 
and sanctities, heretical beliefs or lack of religious belief, focus on money, 
and relentless persecution of Muslims.15 
                                                 
13 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 92. 
14 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities,” in Technology and 
Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 12-29. 
15 Anonymous. (Michael Scheuer), Through Our Enemies’ Eyes – Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, 
and the Future of America (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey’s Inc, 2003), 16. 
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While the U.S. military takes part in anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Southeast Asia, America’s domestic terrorist threat remains a serious concern.  
Since 9/11, America remains a prospective battleground for more religiously-motivated 
terrorism by Muslim extremists who call it the “Great Satan,” home to dens of sin, while 
America’s governmental leaders simultaneously communicate a public message of an 
America founded on faith and the value of religious freedom.  
Terrorist organizations would logically consider a major successful domestic 
attack on America’s faith, an enormous victory—perhaps even on the level of 9/11.  If 
that assumption is true, the federal government should lead a centralized effort to protect 
America’s religious venues from a domestic terrorist attack. 
Since 9/11, the United States has gone to great lengths to fortify its defenses, 
increase deterrence measures, and heighten security awareness in many critical areas.  
Historical landmarks and critical infrastructure have received significant attention and 
funding, but when looking at the umbrella of homeland security as a whole, one 
important private sector of American society is conspicuously unprotected—religion.  
With America continuing to fight primarily Islamic militants, including insurgents in an 
occupied Iraq, and its continuing efforts to harden more critical infrastructure, the 
potential exists for an attack on a “soft” religious target within the United States. 
Although a string of simultaneous attacks on major American religious landmarks 
or leaders has not occurred, attacks against symbolic religious sites overseas have 
become more common.  Indeed, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a plan to attack 
the Vatican with a hijacked aircraft on Christmas Eve 2003 was disrupted.16  In 2001, the 
Taliban destroyed historic Buddhist statues in Afghanistan because they were considered 
symbols of idolatry and were simply not Muslim.  Throughout 2004, radical Islamic 
extremist terrorists also attacked Christian churches in Pakistan and throughout Iraq.   
Another reason religious venues may be targeted by terrorists is less obvious.  A 
major televised or highly publicized attack on a religious venue in America could have a 
global secondary effect.  An irrational actor might see an attack of this nature as a self-
                                                 
16 Phillip Willan, “Italy’s PM in Vatican air terror mystery,” Observer (December 28, 2003), 1. 
http://observer.guardian.co.uk/europe/story/0,11363,1113185,00.html (accessed February 11, 2006) 
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fulfilling triggering mechanism to illicit a military response from the United States and 
the West.  Their organization could then dictate events and terms reaping the same sort of 
sympathy among Muslims world-wide that the insurgency in Iraq is reaping among most 
Muslims in early 2006.    
In 2004 George Bush was reelected on a campaign that, among other issues, 
centered and succeeded on the support of America’s religious right.  His campaign 
speeches repeatedly touched upon his personal faith and the faith of America’s founding 
fathers, and it was that message, that public diplomacy, that was also broadcast around 
the world.  It is feasible that terrorist organizations and the theocracies that back them 
perceive that claim as a source of power and in defiance of their version of Islam, making 
it worthy of Jihad in the form of assaults against symbols of Western faith.  
Operation Iraqi Freedom and its subsequent transformation into a battle between 
the West and a significant insurgent/jihadist mix, may be enough, independently, to add 
American religious sites and leaders onto a list of high priority targets for Islamic 
terrorists.  
The federal government, for its part, continues to be suspicious of America’s 
Muslim population.  In December of 2005, a U.S. News and World Report article 
informed the world that America continues to perceive Muslims as a potential threat to 
national security.  The article disclosed that the federal government (the FBI specifically) 
was conducting active radiation detection monitoring on Muslims in the United States, 
including U.S. citizens and their places of worship.17  Shortly thereafter, a New York 
Times article disclosed that American citizens with suspected ties to terrorist 
organizations were having their phone conversations monitored via listening devices used 
by the National Security Agency (NSA).18  This acknowledgement, once again, indicated 
that the American Muslim population was the primary focus of the ongoing surveillance.    
With the U.S. universally seen as the perennial backer of the state of Israel, and 
Israel’s history of warfare with predominantly Muslim countries, the idea of a major                                                  
17 David Kaplan, “Exclusive: Nuclear Monitoring of Muslims Done Without Search Warrants,” U.S. 
News and World Report (December 22, 2005). 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/nest/051222nest.htm (accessed February 11, 2006). 
18 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,” New York Times, 
December 16, 2005, A1. 
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American Judeo-Christian religious landmark or leader being targeted simply because of 
America’s alliance with Israel is also a possibility.  There is an inherent danger for 
America in this association as highlighted by Bruce Hoffman when he wrote about a 
failed operation in the early 1980s launched by Israeli terrorists to destroy the Dome of 
the Rock, Islam’s third holiest shrine: 
They were convinced that through their actions they could themselves 
hasten redemption.  Even more alarming, though, was the terrorists’ 
ancillary motive.  By obliterating so venerated an Islamic shrine, they also 
sought to spark a cataclysmic war between Israel and the Muslim world.19 
A similar attack today could quickly embroil America directly in a Middle Eastern war 
because of its alliance with Israel, immediately making the American homeland and its 
religious venues potential battlefields.  
      
C. THE TERRORISTS 
Author Clark McCauley, Professor of Psychology at Bryn Mawr College at the 
University of Pennsylvania, offers another rationale for how Islamic terrorists approach 
targeting.  His approach could also apply to the targeting of American religious venues 
when viewed from the perspective of terrorist organizations experiencing a “psychology 
of crisis:” 
The psychology of cause and comrades is multiplied by a sense of 
crisis.  Many observers have noted an apocalyptic quality in the 
worldview of terrorists.  Terrorists see the world precariously balanced 
between good and evil, at a point where action can bring about the 
triumph of the good….Action, extreme action, is required immediately, 
for the triumph of the good and the defeat of evil.20 
 
Some might argue that Islam, as one of the three Abrahamic faiths, conceptually 
holds Jesus as a Prophet and His teachings as holy and worthy of respect and therefore 
not at risk of an Islamist attack.   Attacks on churches and the possibility that a 
psychology of crisis exists with modern day radical Islam, however, offer another view – 
that an attack on the West’s “faith infrastructure” is feasible. 
                                                 
19 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 103. 
20 Clark McCauley, “Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism and the Response to 
Terrorism,” in The Psychology of Terrorism, vol. 3, ed. Chris E. Stout (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 3-30.  
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While America may desire to maintain its historically strict separation of church 
and state, the country remains engaged in an asymmetric war with terrorist organizations 
that don’t hesitate to attack churches in Pakistan and Iraq.  In short, terrorists in search of 
a religious target in America have a host of potential targets and attack profile options 
from which they can choose. 
Author Robert Pape, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago 
and terrorism expert, in The Strategic Logic of Terrorism, describes a category of 
terrorism called “destructive terrorism” as one that is “more aggressive, seeking to coerce 
opponents as well as mobilize support for the cause.  Destructive terrorists seek to inflict 
real harm on members of the target audience at the risk of losing sympathy for their 
cause.”21  In short, an organization practicing this extreme method of terrorism doesn’t 
care about the ramifications of its attack, as long as it achieves a high magnitude of 
destruction.    
The Al Qaeda profile is certainly high on America’s homeland security watch list, 
but there are also other threats from organizations which might have an interest in 
attacking a religious site or leader dear to the greater American population’s interest.  A 
number of terrorist threats may be envisioned: 
- Extreme single-issue terrorist groups, or like-minded individuals, who desire a 
conflict between the West and Islam.   
- U.S. Muslims who have immigrated legally – Large Muslim populations exist 
near many American metropolitan areas and nodes of critical infrastructure, providing an 
invaluable resource to both foreign and domestic radical Islamic terrorists, as well as a 
support network the 9/11 Commission Report determined was important to the success of 
the 9/11 attacks.22 
- Nation of Islam – Although it has no history of militant leanings, a radicalized 
Nation of Islam would provide many new challenges to Homeland Security, including 
increased terrorist identification challenges, the impact of a large U.S. prison influence, 
and continued spread throughout the country. 
                                                 
21 Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, 
no. 3 (August 2003): 343.  
22  9/11 Commission Report.  217-220. 
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- Type-A Terrorists – In their study, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism, 
Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins argue that the Type A terrorist is driven by the action or the 
passion itself.23  This type of terrorist would pose an extreme risk based on their 
propensity to do whatever it takes, even irrational behavior, to achieve their goals. 
-   Other militant Islamic groups, such as Hamas, etc., who may wish to focus their 
efforts towards achieving an independent Palestine by shifting their efforts to the United 
States in an attempt to create a lever of influence for their agenda in the Middle East. 
 
D. TARGET SELECTION 
While military and federal government installations become increasingly 
hardened targets, much of America remains vulnerable, including shopping malls, 
schools, major sporting events, and places of worship (often highly populated locales).  
Terrorists might target symbolic American religious targets that represent American 
values at their most, ironically, sacred.   As described in a July 2005 CIA Al-Qaeda threat 
publication, Intelligence reporting since 2001 continues to suggest that Al Qaeda views 
soft targets, which would include religious venues in general, as viable alternatives to 
more hardened targets.24 
Clearly, the attacks of 9/11 set a fateful standard of Islamic Extremist attacks on 
U.S. soil with the Al Qaeda terrorist organization achieving unparalleled success, 
notoriety, and, to other terrorist groups, a standard and level of glory to be admired and 
pursued. 
On 9/11, Al Qaeda achieved a victory which will forever be replayed and 
reprinted in the media, commonly referred to as a day that will “live in imagery.” The 
symbolism of the American and United airliners crashing into the financial heart of New 
York City, the impact on the American military bastion of power - the Pentagon, and the 
attempted attack on American government itself at the White House or Capitol Building 
were as operationally cunning, impressive, stunning, and simple in their execution as they 
                                                 
23 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A 
Component in the War on al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 11. 
24 A Collection of CTC/OTA’s Papers on Al-Aq’ida’s Threat to the U.S. Homeland, Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorism Center’s Office of Terrorism Analysis, July 7, 2005 
(Unclassified/For Official Use Only), 14. 
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were grotesquely heinous to the civilized West.  If symbolic attacks were that successful 
in 2001, and organizations like Al Qaeda have shown a desire to ensure their attacks on 
embassies and the USS Cole are also captured in imagery, an assumption that further 
symbolic attacks are probable is no stretch of the imagination.  Since financial, 
government, and military targets have already been attacked, the idea of a different 
symbolic target, such as those with religious affiliation, may also be plausible. 
There are many target selection scenarios that can be postulated.  For example, an 
attack at a highly populated Billy Graham religious gathering would provide a large 
number of victims all of whom would be seen suffering on a video-recorded and possibly 
televised stage and broadcast to millions around the world.  It could also be conducted 
against Graham’s self-described “Christian Crusade,” which would almost certainly be 
perceived as an attack against a crusade in Muslim countries and serve to feed the 
interests of the attacking terrorist organizations, regardless of the use or intent of the 
Graham ministry’s use of the word “Crusade.”  In addition, a successful terrorist attack 
on the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C. could be viewed on Al Jazeera by 
millions of Muslims as a successful strike against an icon of both American government 
and religion.  It would be an ideal target in that it resides in the nation’s capital, arguably 
has the perceived international image of being symbolically “national” in prominence 
based on its name, and the fact that it is a majestic building where numerous Protestant 
faiths worship.  Finally, the National Cathedral is where the President of the United 
States and his family worship (as well as numerous other senior politicians and allied 
dignitaries).    If there was significance in the fact that the 9/11 attackers chose American 
and United airline flights to hijack (based on their perceived nationalistic company 
names), it makes the idea of the National Cathedral being targeted plausible.  Other 
potential targets might include the Crystal Cathedral in Coral Gables, Florida; a highly-
populated Jewish Synagogue in any urban city (thus aligning the Jewish and Christian 
faiths further against Islam); or a highly-populated Roman Catholic service, preferably 
one led by a prominent and senior Bishop (thus meeting the Islamic perspective of their 
culture where religious leaders like Imams are extremely important in their faith). 
Another possible scenario would be for the terrorists to attack a religious venue 
and coordinate a simultaneous attack upon other symbolic targets that might represent 
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evil to a radical Islamic fundamentalist (e.g., Las Vegas casinos, Bourbon Street in New 
Orleans, Hollywood, etc.).  In one series of attacks, the attackers might forever link 
Judeo-Christian worship sites and stereotypically “sinful” sites in the minds of Muslims 
world-wide and win a much larger information warfare campaign, ultimately gaining 
even more ground for the terrorists and their agendas. 
   
E. TIMING 
As demonstrated on 9/11, Al Qaeda’s method of operations centered on a near- 
simultaneous attack plan to maximize the effect of surprise.   The aforementioned 2005 
CIA Al-Qaeda threat publication states, “Hitting a number of such structures 
simultaneously could have the same effect as hitting a single high-profile (and more 
hardened) target.”25 
Al Qaeda’s attack planning has historically involved the capturing of video 
imagery during their attacks for use in their information warfare campaigns and public 
diplomacy.   Logically, the timing might be in conjunction with events that draw large 
audiences or events that are televised, thereby reaching a much broader audience and 
increasing the likelihood of repeated images being received throughout the developed 
world at large.  As at 1972 terrorist incident in Munich or in the case of the Chechen-
Separatist terrorist attack on a Russian School house in Beslan in 2004 when 331 
hostages were killed, including 186 children, terrorists may also try to maximize and 
magnify the effect of their message through the media.26     
High-visibility National Special Security Events (NSSEs) might offer the perfect 
venue of publicity, politics, and population for the terrorists to mark in conjunction with 
an attack on a religious landmark, for example.  Terrorists could also coordinate their 
attacks to coincide with religious holidays (e.g., Good Friday), significant anniversaries 
(e.g., 9/11), or events with VIP’s in attendance (e.g., President Bush attending services at 
the National Cathedral) and meet all the requirements of an optimal, and increasingly 
classic, Al Qaeda attack.   
                                                 
25 A Collection of CTC/OTA’s Papers, 14. 
26 Fatima Tlisova, “Beslan Panel:  Authorities Botched Rescue,”  Associated Press, Tuesday, 
November 29, 2005.  www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/29/AR2005112900481.html (accessed February 11, 2006) 
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F. ATTACK PROFILES 
Depending on the location of the religious target and the terrorists’ ability to 
conduct reconnaissance and pre-attack operational planning, terrorists have myriad attack 
profiles, ranging from simple to complex, from which they can select.    
An armed terrorist attack and hostage-taking scenario at a religious venue, in the 
context of this research, is the most probable scenario.  A lone terrorist or a small 
organization of terrorists could conduct an armed attack with small arms easily accessible 
in the United States at gun shows or even Wal-Mart.  The taking of hostages, as in the 
attack at Beslan, would guarantee media coverage, but be a terminal event (the attackers 
would either be arrested or killed).    
Likewise, the attackers might elect to use a bomb (e.g., incendiary, fertilizer-
based explosive material as used in Oklahoma City, staged plastic explosives such as the 
types used in the Madrid and London train bombings, etc.).  A well-planned bombing 
would provide the bombers with an opportunity to clear the area before the explosion, 
and thus the chance of surviving the experience and plan and execute later attacks.  The 
terrorist cell and its base of operations would remain uncompromised and fully 
operational. 
As seen routinely in Iraq, suicide bombing is another method of attack terrorists 
could use in America.  The difficulty in acquiring an adequate amount of high-yield 
explosives, however, would make it challenging to successfully execute.  Reconstituting 
their operational cells of aspiring martyrs in the United States (as opposed to their 
seemingly never ending supply in Iraq) might make this option less palatable.  Given that 
churches, for example, unlike airports and federal buildings across the country, are not 
required to have traffic barriers in front of their entrances, they are therefore more 
vulnerable to a vehicle-laden bomb and, based on the inherent openness of their 
subcultures, even more vulnerable to a pedestrian suicide bomber.   With America’s 
challenging border security status, an attack on a religious venue with a weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) is also feasible, although less probable – based on it being difficult to 
acquire. 
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If the modus operandi of terrorists remains true, they will continue to plan and 
attack vulnerable soft targets, striking at a time and location of their choosing, and only 
after thorough planning, reconnaissance, and rehearsals. 
G. CONSEQUENCES OF A TERRORIST ATTACK UPON A RELIGIOUS 
VENUE IN AMERICA  
A terrorist organization that successfully attacked a religious target in America 
would reap multiple benefits.  An Islamist attack on a Judeo-Christian place of worship 
would, arguably, be considered retribution and justified in the “1000-year memory” of 
Islam, anchored in the dark history of the Crusades and ending in the most recent Arab 
broadcasts of the aforementioned U.S. atrocities in Iraq.  The terrorists would be seen as 
righteous, effectively attacking infidel faiths.  Their attacks would be a show of strength 
against “corrupt” Western and American values and America’s sense of religious 
freedom upon which the country was founded.  The act of violence would simultaneously 
send a signal of Islamic power, success, and superiority to the greater Muslim population 
of the world.  Any retaliatory attack by the West could result in the establishment, 
synthesis, renewal, and uprising of the Islamic Caliphate against the West. 
If a terrorist attack did occur at a religious venue in America, it would affect 
citizens in a very personal way.  The imagery of airliners crashing into the World Trade 
Centers was tragic, but watching individual victims leaping to their deaths from the Twin 
Towers personalized that terror for every viewer regardless of their proximity to New 
York.  Likewise, an attack upon a church might achieve more terrifying results on an 
even more intimate level – threatening individual Americans where many feel the safest, 
including places of worship. Terror is a state of extreme psychological fear and a place of 
worship is a venue commonly associated with comfort.   If an act of terror took place in a 
house of faith, the dichotomy of those two extremes of human emotion might magnify 
the resulting trauma.  In 1999, an American religious venue near Fort Worth, Texas, 
became the scene of murder when a crazed gunman opened fire inside Wedgewood 
Baptist Church: 
On September 15, 1999, a deranged man in a black trench coat entered a 
church in Ft. Worth, Texas, armed with bullets and a pipe bomb. He 
approached a group of worshippers in the foyer awaiting choir practice. 
He asked about a prayer meeting, and then began shooting. He headed to 
the sanctuary, which he sprayed with gunfire as he shouted obscenities. 
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Seven were dead and many more injured. A teenage boy stopped the 
slaughter when he yelled out defiantly, “You can kill me but you can’t kill 
my faith!” Upon hearing those words, the assassin found a pew, sat down, 
and shot himself… The morning after the massacre an impromptu prayer 
session was held at the pastor’s house. The church was now a crime scene, 
filled with police, coroners, chalked lines, bullet-ridden oak walls, and 
blood-soaked carpets. A surprise attendee at that prayer session was Texas 
Governor George W. Bush, who made the 186-mile trip from Austin. He 
arrived unannounced and left almost as quietly. A church of God had been 
converted into a Texas killing field, and the governor came to offer his 
personal prayers.27 
For individuals, a terrorist attack at an American place of worship could result in 
panic, acts of retribution, an unsettling of their personal and professional lives not unlike 
the attacks of 9/11, and an overall heightened sense of personal fear that could have 
serious effects on health and well-being if prolonged.    
An attack on a religious venue in America could have similar effects on American 
society as a whole, including actual panic of the masses, isolation of the populace as 
citizens avoid public gatherings including worship sites and develop and manifest a 
widespread lack of faith in governmental and religious leaders. 
If terrorists succeeded in attacking a religious venue within the United States, the 
ability of governmental and religious leaders to adequately deal with the psychological 
aftermath among the American populace would be dependent upon thorough pre and 
post-incident planning and training. 
Of course, an attack on a religious venue in America could have quite the 
opposite effect.  The public’s response to an act of terror against a religious venue might 
have the same effect of the 9/11 attacks, when the country was caught up in a wave of 
nationalism not seen since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.  An outraged public could 
also become resolved in its solidarity and defiantly attend public worship services across 
the country.  For example, the day after the attack on the church in Fort Worth, Texas, 
Senior Pastor Dr. Al Meredith, issued a press release to the public and his congregation, 
including the following excerpt: 
…At present, we are hoping to return to our Worship Center on Sunday 
morning at the regular times of 9:00 and 10:35 a.m.  This has not been an 
                                                 
27 Dr. Paul Kengor, “A Governor and a Shooting in Fort Worth,” September 24, 2004.  
www.gcc.edu/alumni/vvconcise/2004/Sept_24_04_Kengor.html (accessed February 11, 2006) 
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easy decision as many have been left deeply traumatized.  However, we 
believe it is important that we not allow the Kingdom of Darkness to  
 
 
hinder what God wants to accomplish in His people.  Our Sunday School 
classes will function as small group support teams as the Body comforts 
one another.28 
 
                                                 
28 Dr. Al Meredith, “Press Release 9/16/99, Wedgwood Baptist Church,”  
www.wedgwoodbc.org/default.asp?page=101&action=getpage (accessed February 11, 2006) 
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III. RELIGIOUS VENUE SECURITY 
If the Almighty were to rebuild the world and asked me for advice, I 
would have English Channels round every country. And the atmosphere 
would be such that anything which attempted to fly would be set on fire. 
~ Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
 
A. AMERICA’S RELIGIOUS SECURITY TODAY  
Today, no federal agency has been specifically assigned the responsibility of 
protecting or monitoring the security of major religious landmarks or icons within the 
United States.  The U.S. Department of the Interior is assigned historical landmark 
protection which covers sites like the Alamo in San Antonio, Texas, and Independence 
Hall in Philadelphia, PA, but not major active sites of worship or sites with a significant 
identity with particular faiths (e.g., The Temple Square of the Mormon Tabernacle in Salt 
Lake City, Utah or St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York City, NY.).    
Security at the National Cathedral in Washington, DC is provided by the Secret 
Service whenever the President or other dignitaries are in attendance, but the cathedral 
remains normally unprotected by federal law enforcement officials.29 
Today, the Billy Graham Ministry, Inc. and other major religious figures contract 
their security through private security firms or the contracting of off-duty police officers.  
At their televised events a team of retired and volunteer security officers with various law 
enforcement backgrounds provide protection.30  
There has been limited governmental involvement in religious security matters on 
the local, state, and federal levels:  
 
B. LOCAL INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS SECURITY IN AMERICA 
Besides “routine” engagement initiatives, the events of 9/11 and the onset of the 
war in Iraq caused major metropolitan cities, like New York, to incorporate “surge” 
strategies to deter terrorism at home.   New York City’s well-publicized “Hercules 
                                                 
29 www.secretservice.gov. (accessed February 28, 2006) 
30 Toney Carnes, “Billy Does it Again,” ChristianityToday.com.  June 28, 2005. 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2005/126/23.0.html (accessed February 11, 2006). 
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Teams” set a modern day standard for law enforcement surge operations.  Author Craig 
Horowitz described the Hercules Teams in his NewYorkMetro.com interview with New 
York’s Police Commissioner Ray Kelly: 
 And there are the Hercules Teams, elite, heavily armed, Special 
Forces-type police units that pop up daily around the city.  It can be at the 
Empire State Building, the Brooklyn Bridge, Times Square, or the stock 
exchange, wherever the day’s intelligence reports suggest they could be 
needed.  These small teams arrive in black suburbans, sheathed in armor-
plated vests and carrying 9-mm. submachine guns – sometimes with air or 
sea support.  Their purpose is to intimidate and to very publicly mount a 
show of force.  Kelly knows that terrorists do a lot of reconnaissance, and 
the Hercules Teams were designed to disrupt their planning.  Like an ADT 
warning sign in front of a house, they’re also intended to send a message 
that this is not an easy target.31 
On a smaller scale and with a more holistic approach, civic action groups have 
shown an inclination to take an active role in the security of their communities, working 
directly with local government to help fight crime, including the protection of religious 
worship sites.   In Grants Pass, Oregon, a city of approximately 25,000 residents, an 
organization called “Concerned Fathers Against Crime” or C-FAC has been working 
closely with local police since 1995 in a community-policing effort that helps protect 
homes, schools, and churches, among other sites.   This initiative now has the political 
support of a U.S. Congressman and has found its government and church-backed 
initiative gaining access to the national stage in Washington, D.C.32   C-FAC founder Mr. 
Bob Just, addresses this grass-roots effort of locals taking care of problems locally when 
he stated, “We use the system of the family – fathers, mothers and soon the youth – 
working together on different missions to build what Congressman Walden called 
‘community connectedness’ in his recent letter about us to [DHS Secretary Michael] 
Chertoff.”33 
Unlike a Papal visit, the security requirements for a visit by other major religious 
figures are predominately the responsibility of local authorities.  In 1995, the city of New 
                                                 
31 Craig Horowitz, “The NYPD’s War on Terror,” NewYorkMetro.com, February 3, 2003. 
www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/features/n_8286 (accessed February 11, 2006) 
32 Ron Strom, “Homeland Insecurity: Church-based civil defense?  Small-town plan reaches White 
House door,” wnd.com, November 16, 2005.  http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=47424 
(accessed February 28, 2006) 
33 Ibid. 
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Bedford, Massachusetts hosted a visit by the late Nobel Prize winning Mother Teresa.   
Security was the number one concern for New Bedford officials with numerous 
precautions taken, including:  a six-block vehicular parking ban, a physician and 
emergency medical personnel on standby, 60 uniformed and plain clothed police officers 
on duty, a full motorcade escort, use of four K-9 dogs for crowd control and bomb 
detection, an operational command center, the use of metal detectors at every door of the 
church, and even an alteration to the proceedings of the Mass itself – communion was 
taken by the public from the center of the church, vice near the alter where Mother Teresa 
was seated.34   
Local involvement in religious security is not limited to local government.   
During the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah, The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints enacted heightened temporary security procedures for a 40-acre 
downtown area, including Temple Square, the Conference Center, Joseph Smith 
Memorial Building, and the Church Office Building.   During the Olympics, church 
officials leased metal detectors, used heightened mail-handling procedures in light of the 
recent anthrax scare, and searched handbags and other closed containers.35   
Since 9/11, many large so-called “megachurches” in America have developed 
positions for full-time security directors for their congregations, some of which number 
in the thousands.  In the October 2004 issue of Security Management, author Michael 
Gips wrote about an organized group of these megachurches, called the “Gatekeeper’s 
Alliance.”  Gips writes about a group of these megachurches: 
…about 20 of them have banded together in a group called the 
Gatekeeper’s Alliance … to share and discuss security information and 
suggestions.   With religious hostility more evident since 9-11, and violent 
attacks at houses of worship in Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Tunisia, India, and 
elsewhere, some administrators at high-profile U.S. religious facilities or 
symbols feel the terrorist threat increasing. 36   
                                                 
34 Carol Lee Costa-Crowell, “Security is tight for Mother Teresa Visit,” Standard Times, June 13, 
1995. http://www.southcoasttoday.com/daily/06-95/06-13-95/0613mothersecurity.HTML (accessed 
February 11, 2006). 
35 Lynn Arave, “Metal Detectors Will Leave Temple Square After Event,” Deseret News, October 30, 
2001.  http://deseretnews.com/oly/view/0,3949,35000118,00.html (accessed February 11, 2006). 
36 Michael Gips, “Protection Goes Beyond Prayer,” Security Management 48, no. 10 (2004): 18.  The 
leader of Gatekeeper’s Alliance, Mr. Chuck Chadwick, is the security director of Fellowship Church in 
Grapevine, Texas.  Fellowship Church’s weekly attendance is approximately 20,000. 
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At the local level, Jewish synagogues have been forced to deal more directly with 
security of their worship services, especially in the wake of 9/11.   At Beth El synagogue 
in Norfolk, Virginia, off-duty police officers attend all worship services.  The Synagogue 
officials issue admission tickets for high holy days and routinely keep the outer doors 
locked during services.   If a threat emerges, the Rabbi also has the means to trip a silent 
alarm.37     
 
C. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS SECURITY IN AMERICA 
At the state level, there have also been instances of proactive routine law 
enforcement efforts involving religious venue security.  The Commonwealth of Virginia, 
under its “Crush Crime” campaign, initiated a landmark religious security program called 
“Worship Watch:” 
In response to the number of worship center burnings that occurred in 
recent years, the Virginia State Police developed the Worship Watch 
Program utilizing Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 
(CPTED) techniques -- the practice of determining natural surveillance, 
territorial reinforcement, natural access control and target hardening for 
businesses, homes and communities.  With Worship Watch, troopers 
assess the safety of the worship center and make recommendations for 
improvement and crime prevention, and they also meet with the religious 
head of the center and other leadership to train them on crime prevention 
techniques to protect their centers and members.38 
D. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN RELIGIOUS SECURITY IN AMERICA 
In 1997, President Clinton established the National Church Arson Task Force 
(NCATF) because of the mounting church arson fires primarily in the Southern United 
States.   During the Civil Rights era of the 1960s, black churches were being fire-bombed 
throughout the southern United States, and as the crimes continued, the issue finally rose 
to the federal level.   This was the first incident where a task force of various federal 
agencies combined forces to directly affect the security of private religious venues.  The 
NCATF was comprised of members of the Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department 
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38 Crush Crime Campaign. Virginia State Police, 1995.  www.vsp.state.va.us/crime_prevention.htm 
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of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).  From 1996 to 1998 the Federal Government awarded 3 million 
dollars in grants to counties in 13 states to improve their surveillance and enforcement 
efforts near their most vulnerable houses of worship.39  In the Task Force’s Year 2000 
Report to the President, over 827 arsons were investigated, resulting in 294 convictions.  
Additionally, the task force assisted many of the nation’s churches via security 
consultations, including recommendations for extra exterior lighting, neighborhood 
watch-like policies, etc.  The ATF also offers citizens the “Threat Assessment Guide for 
Houses of Worship” to share lessons learned from the NCATF, its recommendations 
being primarily arson-focused, however, and without a post-9/11 counter-terrorism 
theme.40  
Whether or not there is a direct correlation between the task force’s efforts and the 
decrease in church arson fires can be debated, but a senior ATF Agent recently described 
the NCATF as still intact, but not as active as it had been during the Clinton 
Administration.41  If the task force can be seen as a success, it would be because of its 
Presidentially-directed establishment and support.  
In the end, however, private security organizations constitute the vast majority of 
religious security support, with the federal, state, and local governments only getting 
involved when a specific threat or a national terror alert makes it a priority.  Such was the 
case in May of 2003, when the terror alert was raised and New York City government 
officials sent their Hercules Teams near potential terrorist targets, including churches and 
synagogues, in an effort to disrupt and deter an attack.42 
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http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/gen_pub/arson98.htm, (accessed February 11, 2006). 
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26 
E. OTHER NATIONAL RELIGIOUS SECURITY MODELS 
Of all Western sites, the Vatican is probably the best protected.  Swiss soldiers 
protect the Holy See and the Vatican grounds.  Since 1505, Swiss Guards have protected 
the Vatican, wearing ceremonial uniforms of vibrant orange and purple, and 
Conquistador helmets.  The Official Swiss Guard website provides further background: 
The Swiss Guard currently consists of a total of 100 men: four officials, 
one chaplain, twenty-three noncommissioned officers, seventy halberdiers, 
and two drummers. The halberd is the traditional weapon carried by Swiss 
Guards. The members of the Swiss Guard reside in a barrack in Vatican 
City. They serve for two years, with the possibility of extending the period 
to a maximum of twenty-five years. During this period they receive 
training in self-defense, attend shooting practice, take courses in Italian 
and study the organizational structure of the Vatican. At the end of the 
first year they must take a very thorough exam.  Guard recruits must be 
Roman Catholic men of Swiss nationality who are single, under thirty 
years old and stand at least 5-feet, 8-inches tall. Guards need to have 
completed their initial military training in the Swiss Armed Forces, and 
obtained a certificate of good conduct from an ecclesiastical and a civil 
authority. The Swiss Guard is all that is left of a pontifical military corps 
that medieval popes once fielded to exert temporal power on a part of the 
Italian peninsula - power that is now restricted to the 108 acres of Vatican 
City.43 
The Swiss Guards protect the Vatican and the Pope during his travels, but they are 
inadequately prepared for an attack on the level of that experienced on 9/11.   
Efforts to study and analyze Israeli religious venue security policies and 
procedures were unsuccessful.   Regarding Israeli religious venue security policies 
specifically, one is hard-pressed to find open-source information on governmental 
involvement in security standardization.  It is just as noteworthy, however, that there is an 
abundance of Anti-Defamation League (ADL) precautionary security guidance on the 
Internet while the Israelis, long a target of religiously-motivated terrorism, are 
understandably secretive about their security procedures for religious venues. 
                                                 
43 Vatican Swiss Guard official website,  http://ch.c-d.org/ch/culture_swissguard.html (accessed 
February 11, 2006).   
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IV. FEDERAL POLICY REVIEW 
People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will 
govern them; worship as they please; educate their children—male and 
female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor.  These values 
of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society – and the 
duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common 
calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages. 
~ President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, September 17, 2002. 
 
A. CURRENT U.S. POLICY AND APPLICABLE LITERATURE 
This literature review briefly probes and assesses research surrounding federal 
policies towards the physical security of major religious landmarks, leaders, or events 
within the United States.  The literature reviewed consisted of major national strategic 
policies that deal with national security.  This research found that there is an absence of 
significant literature which addresses this issue specifically, however, there is an 
abundance of information available on critical infrastructure protection, including 
historical landmarks, etc.    
Besides the well-known historical precedent of the bloody Crusades and the 
current struggle of radical Islam against the West being fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
there is another consideration regarding the physical protection of religious sites, events, 
or leaders at home—America’s separation of church and state. Indeed, for the purposes of 
this research there exists a significant paradox:  in the United Sates, federal, state, and 
local governments cannot mandate control and protection over one of the nation’s most 
prized civil liberties—freedom of religion. The U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment 
reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”44  Although this leads many to believe that government cannot get 
involved with religious affairs, when read literally, the amendment can mean that 
                                                 
44  U.S. Const. First Amendment.  http://www.archives.gov/national-archives-
experience/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html (accessed March 9, 2006) 
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government in America cannot have a preference towards a particular religion when 
making laws.  Indeed, Author Michael J. Malbin, in his policy study “Religion and 
Politics: The Intentions of the Authors of the First Amendment,” wrote: 
All of the speakers, except Sherman, agreed that the Bill of Rights should 
prohibit the new government from establishing a national religion.  In 
addition, they did not want the government to have the power deliberately 
to favor one religion over another.  But every one of them also seemed to 
agree that the Bill of Rights should not prevent the federal government 
from giving nondiscriminatory assistance to religion, as long as the 
assistance is incidental to the performance of a power delegated to the 
government.45 
Additionally, it is also noteworthy that the U.S. Constitution is the only official federal 
document or policy that addresses religion as a national priority. 
In President Bush’s introduction to The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America, he mentions freedom of worship as a universal desire.46  Although it 
was published one year after the attacks of 9/11, and speaks of deterrence, its primary 
focus is on the importance of intelligence gathering and transforming America’s military 
to meet the current threat of terrorism.  Perhaps not surprisingly, given the broad range of 
vulnerabilities facing the nation following 9/11, nowhere in the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) is religious security addressed. 
The Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-8) does not directly address 
the security of religious venues in America, however, it does define the term 
preparedness as referring to “the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and 
equipment necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the ability to 
prevent, respond to, and recover from major events.”47  It also designates the Secretary of 
Homeland Security as the principal Federal official for coordinating the implementation 
of all-hazards preparedness in the United States and the development of the National 
Preparedness Goal which establishes “measurable readiness priorities and targets that 
appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major 
                                                 
45  Michael J. Malbin, “Religion and Politics: The Intentions of the Authors of the First Amendment,” 
American Enterprise Institute Studies in Legal Policy (Washington, D.C., 1978), 9. 
46 The White House.  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, 
Presidential Introduction, 1. 
47 The White House.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-8), December 17, 2003, 3-4. 
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disasters, and other emergencies…”48  Although not specifically designated as the lead 
on religious venue security in HSPD-8, based on its wording, the Secretary would be a 
logical candidate for any new federal religious venue oversight guidance.  In March of 
2005, the federal government released its 15 national planning scenarios for disaster 
preparedness and response, including biological, radiological, and nuclear scenarios 
among others, however, no scenario covers an attack on a large public gathering, such as 
the case in a major religious venue worship service (or for that matter, a sporting event or 
concert).49    
The National Strategy for Homeland Security states that America should protect 
its “key assets—Individual targets whose destruction…could create local disaster or 
profoundly damage our Nation’s morale or confidence.”50  This initial strategy also 
describes other examples of critical assets, including local schools, courthouses, and 
bridges as “critical to the communities they serve,” however, it does not list religious 
landmarks, individual churches, special religious events, or the protection of religious 
leaders themselves as critical.51  This strategy reiterates that America’s vulnerabilities are 
seemingly limitless, but offers specific areas which are prioritized to receive resources, 
none of which are religiously affiliated. 
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Key Assets states that one category of key assets “comprises the diverse array of national 
monuments, symbols, and icons that represent our Nation’s heritage, traditions and 
values, and political power.”52  This strategy also includes a list of critical infrastructure 
categories, including “assets of national importance.”  That list includes:  “Large 
gathering sites,” and “national monuments and icons,” two categories that could be 
                                                 
48 The White House.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-8), December 17, 2003, 3-4. 
49 Eric Lipton, “U.S. Report Lists Possibilities for Terrorist Attacks and Likely Toll,” New York Times, 
March 16, 2005. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/16/politics/16home.html?ex=1139806800&en=be460482b4e1d519&ei=
5070 (accessed February 11, 2006). 
50 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 30.  
51 Ibid. 
52 The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Key Assets, February 2003, 71. 
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directly related to religious venues, depending on the significance of the venue.53 
Although religious landmarks may be inferred here, there is, again, no direct reference.   
In April of 2004, $25 million dollars were approved for the Department of 
Homeland Security FY 2005 budget, marking the first time substantial federal funds 
would go directly to the security of religious venues, among other non-profit 
organizations.54  In an unprecedented and significant move, Senators Frist and Specter 
spearheaded the support for monies to be set aside for homeland security equipment, 
personnel, and training to prepare non-profits for international terrorist attacks. 
Ultimately, $25 million dollar appropriations were earmarked in the FY05 budget for 
State Administrative Agencies to sub-grant to local organizations at their discretion.55   
The original High Risk Non-Profit Security Act listed very specific eligibility 
requirements.  In order to be eligible, non-profit organizations had to meet a number of 
requirements, the first being Department of Homeland Security Secretary determination 
“based on the vulnerability of the specific site of the nonprofit organization to 
international terrorist attacks.”56  In order to receive grant monies, eligible non-profits 
would then provide the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security paperwork 
that verifies that the non-profit “hosted a gathering of at least 100 or more persons at least 
once each month at the nonprofit organization site during the preceding 12 months,” or 
“provides services to at least 500 persons each year.”57  In the actual approved grant 
guidance, however, grant eligibility was articulated far more vaguely and matched the 
urban area security initiative (UASI) requirements, including:  existence of “credible  
                                                 
53 The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Key Assets, February 2003, 83. 
54 U.S. Senate, High Risk Nonprofit Security Enhancement Act of 2004, 1-3.  
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/108/h4108.pdf (accessed February 11, 2006). S.2275 to amend the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 was never passed by the Senate. However, the basic initiative was used in 
Congressional conference deliberations for DHS FY 2005 Appropriations which is how the $25 million 
became funded. 
55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security  Office of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness – Office for Domestic Preparedness, Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP), Program Guidelines and Application Kit, October 18, 2004, 69. 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy05hsgp.pdf (accessed February 11, 2006). 
56 U.S. Senate,  High Risk Nonprofit Security Enhancement Act of 2004, 6. 
57 Ibid., 8-9. 
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threat, presence of critical infrastructure, vulnerability, population, population density, 
law enforcement investigative and enforcement activity, and the existence of formal 
mutual aid agreements.”58 
Although the bill and Senator Frist’s Congressional Testimony do not emphasize 
the direct link between federal funding and religious organizations, there as an inference 
in the Senator’s testimony as evidenced by his inclusion of the word “synagogues” as 
authorized non-profit qualified for funding.  In that testimony, Senator Frist also 
articulated the budgetary focus on the threat to soft target non-profits:  
The Director of Central Intelligence has stated that al-Qaeda has turned its 
attention to soft targets….It is my intention, as sponsor with Senator 
Specter of the Senate provision, that the Secretary (Homeland Security) 
should issue regulations to ensure that such funds are disbursed in a 
manner that ensures basic assistance for the maximum number of 
institutions and are dedicated to protecting Americans operating or 
utilizing nonprofits from international terrorist attacks and are not used for 
other purposes.59 
An additional $25 million has been approved for non-profits in FY06, and along 
with meeting all FY05 eligibility requirements, the verbiage for the FY06 
appropriations provides additional requirements:  
That $25,000,000 shall be available until expended for assistance to 
organizations (as described under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 and exempt from tax section  501(a) of such Code) 
determined by the Secretary to be at high risk of international terrorist 
attack, and that these determinations shall not be delegated to any Federal, 
State, or local government official: Provided further, That the Secretary 
shall certify to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the 
House of Representatives the threat to each designated tax exempt grantee 
at least 3 full business days in advance of the announcement of any grant 
award.60 
While no federal governmental strategy delineates religious landmarks or events 
specifically as key assets, there are many Americans who consider their faith, and 
indirectly their church, as a source of their morale, confidence, and personal values and 
                                                 
58 Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), 69. 
59 Congressional Record, Testimony by Senator Bill Frist, October 11, 2004, S11232. 
60 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2006, Public Law 109-90-October 18, 2005, 
13. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ090.109.pdf  (accessed February 11, 2006). 
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therefore worthy of protection.  The successful nonprofit legislation could, arguably, be 
the evidence and proof that religious influence is affecting American politics and 
government.   
 
B. FINDINGS OF LITERATURE REVIEWED 
Three observations emerge from the literature on the Federal Government’s role 
in Homeland Security: 1) The protection of the American way of life and its cultural 
values is important;  2) Critical infrastructure and key asset protection are concrete 
priorities that have been thoroughly covered and funded in major federal homeland 
security strategies implemented by the Bush Administration; and 3) Whereas federal, 
state, local, tribal, and private homeland security responsibilities are routinely mentioned 
in the literature reviewed, the specific role of religious institutions or the protection of 
major religious landmarks, events, or icons is, from this review, seemingly absent from 
the scope of all major federal national and homeland security policies. 
As highlighted earlier, the federal government is taking steps towards funding 
religious venue security, albeit under the broad umbrella of nonprofit security, and 
funding is the perennial litmus test of legitimate federal prioritization.   
Based on this literature review, and even in light of non-profit funding, there 
appears to still be a security vulnerability seam that could be exploited by terrorists 
seeking another major symbolic attack on American soil.  
 
C. CHALLENGES OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 
America’s Founding Fathers felt passionately enough about the importance of 
religion to address it in the U.S. Constitution, but today, in the face of an ongoing global 
war on terror, questions remain.  How can America reconcile its history of separating 
church and state with the potential threat to the nation’s overall national security?  What 
can federal, state, and local governments do to overcome this controversial obstacle to 
greater security at religious venues, if anything? 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (Religion and Expression) is the 
largest challenge that an effort to federally oversee or coordinate security for religious 
venues would probably face. Indeed, it is part of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  There 
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is a common belief in America that it is unconstitutional for government to get involved 
in religious matters.  The First Amendment does state, however, that a single religion 
cannot be championed by legislation nor can government prohibit the free exercise of a 
religion.  Given that interpretation, the Constitution, arguably, represents no literal 
impediment to governmental involvement in issues pertaining to religion and homeland 
security, however governmental forays into religious powder-keg arenas continue to 
garner great public attention, as evidenced by the Intelligent Design, Stem Cell research, 
and the Alabama Ten Commandments Statue controversies of 2004-2005.  Given these 
examples, any governmental public involvement directly with religious security is certain 
to initiate a maelstrom of controversy.   
Another major challenge that strategists will face will be that many religious 
groups may not conform to federal standards regardless of the perceived security benefit 
or the benefit of security grants.  Indeed, many groups may decide to forgo federal 
security standardization and rely on divine intervention for their protection, while others 
may see government as having some role, in varying magnitude.   
To take a more proactive role and place religious security itself in the public eye, 
policy-makers would have to first consider the following: 
• Constitutional issues, specifically those surrounding the separation of Church and 
State described in the First Amendment; 
• Government involvement with religion threatens the constitutionally-attributed 
tenets, principles, and values of American governance, potentially to the point that 
anyone suggesting change would need a strong argument and be prepared to argue 
a coherent case against powerful and influential special interest groups such as the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and other organizations which have the 
capacity to field legions of constitutional litigators;   
• Potential push-back from private religious organizations who might consider any 
governmental involvement (including local and state) as a threat to their 
constitutional rights and ideological or chartered principles. This potential 
whiplash effect, alone, could prove the biggest detriment to governmental 
involvement; 
• The fact that no terrorist organization, to date, has made an overt threat to any 
American religious organization.  It is worth noting, however, that, here,  a valid 
argument exists in support of standardizing law enforcement or security 
engagement in issues of religious security:  Al Qaeda considers the potential of 
operational surprise in their decision-making process so the fact that no credible 
threat streams exist doesn’t necessarily equate to zero threat; 
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• A politician supporting more rigorous religious venue security standards would 
sacrifice significant political capital in the face of no obvious terrorist threat 
against religious venues; 
• Drawing public attention to the issue of religious venue security vulnerability 
could also make it an attractive target for terrorists and potentially place religious 
venues even more at risk because of the historically long timelines that 
government takes to resolve an issue; 
• Funding – Where would the money come from?  What current homeland security 
programs would have to sacrifice funding (and presumably a higher level of 
security) in order to protect religious venues? 
• What federal organization, department, or agency would be responsible for 
monitoring, administering, and enforcing a more robust or standardized security 
program for law enforcement engagement with private religious organizations or 
would a new organization need to be established to meet those requirements?  
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V. ALTERNATIVES FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN 
RELIGIOUS VENUE SECURITY 
The need for homeland security is tied to our enduring vulnerability.  
Terrorists wish to attack us and exploit our vulnerabilities because of the 
freedoms we hold dear.  The U.S. government has no more important 
mission than protecting the homeland from future terrorist 
attacks….Homeland security is a shared responsibility.  In addition to a 
national strategy, we need compatible, mutually supporting state, local, 
and private-sector strategies. 
~ President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
July 16, 2002 
 
In deciding its level of involvement in religious venue security, the U.S. Federal 
Government has three basic options: 
 
A. NO INVOLVEMENT 
This option would be a strict interpretation of Church and State, with absolutely 
no involvement in religious security on the part of the federal government.  The federal 
government would therefore have no security requirements, standards, oversight, 
coordination, nor funding of homeland security grants.  It offers absolutely no strategic or 
operational security oversight by the federal level, leaving all involvement at the State, 
local, and private organizational levels.  Private organizations such as religious 
institutions would continue to provide their own security for events in a manner they 
deem satisfactory.   
This option has already been dismissed by the federal government, as evidenced 
by the FY05 and FY06 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Acts.   
 
B. MAINTAIN STATUS QUO 
This alternative supports the aforementioned FY05 and FY06 Appropriations 
Acts, providing primarily budgetary grants to eligible non-profits with requirements, and, 
as previously discussed, the FY06 federal appropriations language is becoming more  
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restrictive.   States will have more eligibility requirements than the FY05 appropriations 
language mandated, including more restrictions on how they distribute the homeland 
security grant monies.   
This option represents the “lightest” federal government footprint in an incentive-
based form. 
      
C. FEDERALLY REGULATED 
This alternative would be the most draconian option for federal involvement.  The 
federal government would mandate security standardization among all non-profits 
(including religious venues).  Failure of non-profit compliance would result in the loss of 
tax-free status (or some measure of their tax free exemption).    
This policy option would most likely be harshly received by the American Public, 
intrude on America’s societal tenets against direct governmental intrusion into religious 
affairs, and cause significant political problems for policy-makers.  From the outset, this 
alternative would be politically untenable and therefore not a practical option. 
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VI. CLERGY FOCUS GROUP  
In November of 2005, a small focus group of twelve clergy from Hampton Roads, 
Virginia were given a presentation on this topic by the author then surveyed regarding 
their personal opinions about federal government involvement in security for their 
respective houses of worship, including the aforementioned policy options.  Based on the 
small size of the group, the statistical results of the survey are too inconclusive to provide 
valid empirical data, but a few written post-questionnaire comments from the respondents 
were nonetheless enlightening and underscored the sensitivity of some clergy regarding 
government involvement with religious security:  
I am a strong advocate for the separation of church and state with no 
governmental monies going toward a religious organization—even on 
security issues.  While the government may provide law enforcement 
agents as requested, the giving of any monies is not appropriate. 
~ Baptist Minister with 150 congregants 
I wouldn’t want Federal Government involvement at all.  We are currently 
improving our security with a consultant.  
 ~ Episcopal Minister with 400 congregants 
The worst thing I could imagine is the federal government regulating, let 
alone enforcing, what we do with our worship space.  The last thing I want 
is more government intrusion into the religious spheres of life.  Let’s be 
honest and have a little humility, does anyone rationally think our little 
church with its very modest facilities is in any way inviting, let alone 
known to any terrorists…. I could list one hundred more exposed and 
prominent sites on Norfolk’s west side alone….We need much less 
paranoia relative to terrorism—we are not some persecuted minority in 
America.  If I were in a Jewish synagogue I could have a bit more 
sympathy for this effort and rationale.  However, the whole premise rests 
upon a view of a nanny state moving further and further (and more and 
more intrusively) into every square inch of our lives.  What’s next, 
regulating and incentivizing defending our own homes….talk about the 2nd 
Amendment gone amuck…and frankly, if there is ANY legitimacy to our 
little places of worship being exposed to terrorism in our little town, the 
whole country will have devolved into chaos and civil war.  If such 




as involved in a civil struggle as the Northern Irish or Balkans were and as 
we haven’t seen since 1865.  Lord help us then, with our laughably 
inadequate ADT security systems….     
~ Presbyterian Minister with 200 congregants. 
In this small focus group of Protestant clergy, 100 percent: 
• Agreed that there is currently no threat to local religious venues in Norfolk, 
Virginia 
• Agreed that the federal government should have no role in the monitoring of 
religious venue security 
• Did not have a written emergency response or physical security plan 
• Did conduct 100% background investigations on their new employee hires. 
This group of clergy clearly desired a strict interpretation of the separation of church and 
state as it pertained to their religious venues. 
While these results are not statistically rigorous, they do provide the reader with 
an overview of what a small group of religious leaders see as the essential issues 





A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed 
next week. 
~ General George S. Patton, U.S. Army 
This research resulted in a recommendation for federal involvement and a 
proposed model of layered security strategy for religious venue security. 
 
A. RECOMMENDED OPTION FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN 
RELIGIOUS VENUE SECURITY 
Based on this research, the “Status Quo” option of federal involvement is 
recommended, but with a modification towards slightly more federal oversight and 
involvement.  With the wording of the High Risk Nonprofit Security Enhancement Act of 
2004, and subsequent FY05 and FY06 appropriations for non-profits, the issue of a threat 
to actual religious venues has been addressed but not highlighted in a way that would 
bring it to the forefront of the public consciousness, most likely causing significant 
political and legal controversy.  The American public has yet to be confronted with this 
separation of church and state issue in its religious security context and may continue, 
possibly unaware of the significant potential for possible attacks upon religious venues in 
the country.  The public would likely not feel a collective need for action until a major 
attack occurred.   
A more enhanced federal effort to support the equipping, education and training 
of religious organizations would be the most ideal solution to protecting America’s 
religious underbelly based on its voluntary nature and limited intrusiveness.  This method 
of resourcing appears to be the best approach to fusing voluntary collective security 
efforts with incentive-based security training and education.  The additional $25M FY06 
appropriation is another positive step in the process, but there is still no comprehensive 
federal method of tracking those homeland security grants as they’re distributed to local 
non-profits at the State level.  Incentives based on more restrictive qualifying 
requirements would be more contentious, but probably achieve greater unity of effort in 
the quest for greater overall security in this area. 
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Still, governmental leaders would have to determine how America, with its 
limited security resources and competing requirements would tackle prioritization. 
Ultimately, some other federal program budget will have to be cut or reduced in order to 
support this initiative. 
      
B. LAYERED SECURITY STRATEGY END-STATE—THE 
RECOMMENDED MODEL OF RELIGIOUS VENUE SECURITY 
What can the federal government to mitigate the aforementioned effects of a 
successful terrorist attack on a religious venue?—Nothing alone.  Led by the federal 
government, an overall effort among governmental officials and community and religious 
leaders is the only solution to the goal of optimal religious venue security.  Optimal 
religious security can be achieved through a model of layered defense, including both 
routine and surge security capabilities.   
First, a collaborative religious venue security effort would need to have the 






- Early warning system.  Government and religious leaders should pursue a 
standardized early warning system for religious venues across the country.  For example, 
an automated reverse-911-like telephone notification system already used in many areas 
of the country could be developed by the federal government to provide just-in-time 
notification or warning of a religiously motivated act of violence as the news is breaking.  
While it would be of no practical use at the site of an initial attack, a system such as this 
might help prevent or mitigate secondary or attempted simultaneous attacks (as in the Al 
Qaeda method of operation).  In the wake of the tsunami tragedy of 2004, for example, 
world leaders were quick to point out that while no one can predict or prevent a tsunami 
from happening, an early warning system might mitigate tragedy, even among third 
world countries.  That lesson is also applicable here and an early warning system would 
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help achieve timely situational awareness among governmental and religious leaders.  
Increased awareness would result in vigilance then possibly deterrence or even the 
interdiction of a terrorist attack. 
- Education and training.  For years, the Jewish community in America (and the 
world) has been the standard for security training and awareness among its 
congregations.   Similarly, other congregations could be more proactively educated on 
measures of deterrence, mitigation, and terrorist attack planning, methodologies, and key 
identifiers to help prevent an attack from occurring at their place of worship.   
Congregations could utilize federal homeland security grants and be trained on how to 
identify, defend against, and respond to potential terrorist threats.   Terrorism awareness 
training would be provided to congregations, including security procedures involving 
lone terrorists, traffic control outside the worship site, and a “zone defense” approach to 
physical security (outer, middle, and inner) with standard pre-planned procedures to be 
taken depending on a suspected terrorist’s behavior or physical location 61    Emergency 
action plan (EAP) reviews could be conducted in a collaborative environment with 
religious leaders and local police departments .  The law enforcement community would 
assist with EAP development and participate in ongoing consultation as requested.   
- Relationship building.  Local Law enforcement or religious leaders should host 
periodic community outreach programs and meetings where law enforcement officials 
can meet and get to know congregants before an incident occurs, establishing 
relationships that could either help prevent an attack or improve the response process.    
This is community policing with religious venues being the target audience, and it would 
raise the situational awareness of the public to the specific threat of religiously-motivated 
terrorism, and if nothing else, result in closer ties and a mutually beneficial relationship 
between religious organizations and local law enforcement.   
 
2. Deterrence 
- Improved security systems.  All religious venues need to meet minimum 
security standards, including automatic security system installation (where feasible), 
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Enforcement Agencies and Officers (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 22-28. 
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exterior lighting, security conscious building construction or post-construction counter-
measures (eg. aesthetic traffic barriers near the entrance of fixed religious venues.).  
Religious leaders could take advantage of homeland security grants to receive 
architectural design consultation for optimum security, including technological security 
measure planning, access control, etc. (similar to CPTED) 
- Visible security presence. All religious venues should have a visible presence of 
licensed security or police officers during large religious gatherings.  Random anti-
terrorism measures (RAMs) could be routinely utilized.  RAMs are designed to disrupt a 
terrorist’s reconnaissance and attack planning (e.g., changing security patrol schedules, 
lighting schemes, and the re-positioning of traffic barriers, etc.) 
     
3. Preparedness 
- Emergency plans.  All religious venues need pre-incident response plans.  As the 
popular quote notes, “Hope is not a strategy.”  Leaders must have effective plans, train to 
those plans, and possess the capability to communicate their intent to the masses both pre 
and post-incident with clarity and (post-incident) calm.   
Although New York has deployed Hercules Teams to religious worship sites in 
the past, based on intelligence “chatter” or a raised homeland security warning level, 
other triggers could also warrant a surge of local law enforcement or extra security, 
including: 
• Upon visits of religious dignitaries (For example, if the Pope visited New 
York City, Hercules Teams could be deployed as a deterrent even though the 
U.S. Secret Service would be the lead federal agency in charge of the visit – 
layered deterrence) 
• Upon the observation of physical reconnaissance by suspect individuals 
• For any televised religious events (A televised event would be attractive to Al 
Qaeda, for example, based on their track record of projecting terror to the 
masses through imagery.) 
• For highly populated religious events (To a terrorist, large crowds of 
worshipers could result in both a symbolic attack and a high body count) 
Both routine and surge security strategies, when combined, provide a method of 
physical security protection that can meet long-term security needs while “rising to the 
occasion” to meet an imminent threat.     
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Worship Watch and Hercules Teams are just two examples of how law 
enforcement officials around the country are meeting post-9/11 requirements with the 
most efficient and effective use of their security resources.  As shown in both cases, and 
with the NCATF, all levels of governmental law enforcement can effectively deal 
directly with private religious organizations in providing a more secure and safe 
environment in the face of the threat of terrorism. 
A two-pronged approach, having a robust routine LE engagement strategy with 
private religious organizations while simultaneously employing appropriate “surge” plans 
when necessary, provides a layered defense that would be difficult for an organized 
terrorist cell to defeat.  With the terrorist organization’s history of pre-attack 
reconnaissance and deliberate planning, even slight changes in defensive postures could 
prove to be enough deterrence to make a terrorist alter an attack to their disadvantage, 
delay an attack which would provide U.S. authorities more of an opportunity to interdict 
an active cell, or, ideally, abort their attack.   
Applying routine standard security measures across all major faith venues in 
America would logically provide increased security.  As single engagement strategies, 
however, neither routine nor surge operations provide adequate protection, but their 
combined effect becomes a security force-multiplier and, when layered alongside early 
warning notification, RAMs and an effective emergency action plan, the combined 
results will be optimal.   
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Figure 1.   Proposed Security End-State for a religious venue 
 
As shown in Figure 1, routine LE operations and an effective emergency action plan are 
relatively static, while RAMs and Surge Ops would periodically change or shift to help 
thwart terrorist planning efforts. 
Lastly, HSPD-8, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructure Protection and Key Assets, and the list of 15 National Planning Scenarios 
should be re-evaluated to account for terrorist attacks by individual armed terrorists, 
suicide bombers, and the inclusion of religious venues as potential targets.  Without 
clearly articulated religious security priorities in overarching federal strategies such as 
HSPD-8, the requisite attention and funding to improve security will be lacking.      
 
C. CHALLENGES OF THIS MODEL 
If government officials pursued a more robust religious security posture, a number 
of challenges, besides the previously discussed First Amendment concern, would remain: 
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• What about Muslim Mosques in America?   Will Muslims in America get the 
same security training, and is there a risk that security standards information 
could subsequently fall into radical Islamic hands within the United States?   This 
can be done, but a system of vetting security requests would have to be 
developed, along with the designation of a responsible organization within the 
Department of Homeland Security to execute those duties and responsibilities.    
Throughout America, there are metropolitan areas with large Muslim populations 
and numerous, and very active, mosques (e.g., Detroit, Michigan).  Given 
America’s democratic governance model, and its policy of non-exclusion and the 
equal treatment of all major religions, the Muslim faith would most certainly be 
eligible for the same security training and funding as all other major faiths.  With 
that inclusion exists the risk that federal security standards and policies would be 
disclosed to the same faith that Al Qaeda claims as its mandate for violence.      In 
the end, however, the risk of training a potential terrorist organization would still 
exist.     
• What about alternative faiths?  How would their eligibility be determined? Would 
non-mainstream and self-proclaimed “religions” such as the Druids or Wiccas be 
afforded equal treatment, and potentially funding?  The potential for 
constitutional debate is huge.  Initially, the concept of only supporting mainstream 
religions, specifically those that currently qualify for non-profit status by the U.S. 
government would be the rational choices for religious security training and 
funding eligibility.  
• Are there too many religious venues to adequately protect?  Major religious 
venues should be the highest priority and then religious venues in general should 
be addressed. 
• What would be the standard for security prioritization?  A number of factors 
would be included for prioritizing major religious venues, including: 
• Potential symbolism of the target (very subjective) 
• Media potential—Are services or events televised? 
• Population—The larger the audience, the greater likelihood 
of a terrorist attack 
• Timing—Religious anniversaries or historic war-on-terror 
anniversaries which coincide with religious events should 
be considered 
• Religious venues with dignitaries in attendance 
• Many events could be treated in the same way the U.S. 
Government treats National Special Security Events, 






D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In light of this study, a number of questions are raised which merit further 
research. 
If religious sites or events are not currently covered in America’s Homeland 
Security Strategy, should the method of prioritizing critical sites or events be changed? 
Had the terrorists been successful in their efforts to destroy the Vatican, what 
would have been the impact on America and its foreign policy?  What, if any, military 
options would have been taken, and what would have been the international response?   
What, if any, is America’s role in the protection of religious sites overseas, like the 
Vatican for example, which has a personal connection to millions of Catholic Americans? 
Who should be prioritizing religious security concerns—White House or the Department 
of Homeland Security, and should it be reviewed by an independent organization like the 
RAND Corporation or the GAO?    
What types of assets should be dedicated to the protection of major religious 
landmarks, and are Americans willing to sacrifice some of their religious freedoms or 
privileges in the name of higher security? 
Lastly, the potential scenario of a terrorist attack on a religious venue in America 
would be difficult to train against or evaluate without causing significant media attention 
and public alarm.  One option for further training and evaluation would include a closed 
emergency response tabletop planning exercise scenario utilizing a select group of clergy, 
constitutional lawyers, and local, state, and federal government participants to completely 
assess the consequences of a terrorist attack against a religious venue, as well as 





VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Except for 9/11, suicide bombers have conducted their missions abroad.  
That’s going to change, but it’s a credit to the patriotism and decency of 
American Muslims that none of our fellow citizens has strapped on a 
bomb and walked into a Wal-Mart.  Nonetheless, our enemies will find a 
way to bring their deadly campaign back to our doorsteps. …We need to 
prepare for the suicide-bomber blitzkrieg, when murderous zealots come 
at us in waves.62  
~Ralph Peters, author of New Glory: Expanding America’s Global 
Supremacy 
 
It’s not the size of the first step, it’s the direction. 
~ Anonymous 
The federal government of the United States should make defending all religious 
venues, especially worship sites and events that might qualify as having “national 
importance,” a much higher priority.  Today, America’s critical infrastructure and 
historical landmarks are priorities, however, if an attack on a symbol of faith could 
indeed cause a drastic surge in warfare on a geo-political scale, maybe America should 
reevaluate its critical vulnerabilities altogether with an eye towards future long-term 
effects of magnitude vice just the resultant effect of a terrorist attack upon the economy 
or tourism.   
If the terrorists’ modus operandi remains true, they will continue to plan and 
attack vulnerable (soft) targets, striking at a time and location of their choosing, and only 
after thorough planning, reconnaissance, and rehearsals.  It is this operational process that 
makes organized terrorism, itself, vulnerable to standardized and innovative LE 
engagement strategies. 
Today, all levels of government should be more involved with religious venue 
security engagement, and the formulation of adequate policy is desperately needed, 
however without a dedicated effort to collaborate across civic and religious 
organizational boundaries, any effort to affect positive homeland security change in this 
                                                 
62 Ralph Peters, “Living, and Dying, With Suicide Bombers,” USA Today, January 4, 2006, 11. 
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area will be wasted.  Law enforcement agencies and officials throughout America can 
take the examples of New York City and the State of Virginia, tailor them to their 
individual jurisdictional needs, and engage with private religious organizations with a 
strategy that includes both routine and surge procedures.  While the terrorists will always 
have the advantage of timing and location, routine and surge LE strategies, when 
combined with an effective emergency action plan and RAMs, will enable private 
religious organizations to achieve optimal security without religious venues becoming 
unwelcome defensive fortresses that project fear instead of a peaceful setting.   
The 9/11 Commission claimed the 2001 terrorist attacks were due, in large part, to 
a failure of imagination on the part of American officials – their inability to imagine or 
foresee attacks of that type upon America itself.   America is suffering from a similar 
failure of imagination right now as it pertains to protecting our faith-based 
“infrastructure” both at home and abroad.   America’s religious network of myriad 
venues is lacking strategic security oversight or even broad direction from the federal 
government.  Subsequently, it is therefore lacking standards and measures of terrorism 
threat awareness, a deterrent posture, or any preparedness against a terrorist attack. 
If America does not take a more proactive stance in religious venue protection 
and pursue a more proactive federally-led and layered security strategy for religious 
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